In this paper we propose a method for on-line max auditing of dynamic statistical databases. The method extends the Bayesian approach presented in [2], [3] and [4] for static databases. A Bayesian network addresses disclosures based on probabilistic inferences that can be drawn from released data; we have developed algorithms to update the network whenever the database changes. In particular, we consider the case in which records are added or deleted, or some sensitive values change their value. The paper introduces the algorithms and discusses results of a preliminary set of of experimental trials.
INTRODUCTION
A Statistical Database (SDB) is a database system that enables its users to retrieve only aggregate statistics (e.g., mean, max, min, and count) for a subset of the entities represented in the database. Consider, for example, a company database containing salaries of employees. A user may want to determine the max or a min salary of the employees in a subset of records in the database. He/she cannot, however, be allowed to glean the salary of any one employee in particular.
Several methods for protecting privacy in SDBs have been suggested in the literature; see reference [1] for a survey. These methods can be classified under four general approaches: conceptual, data perturbation, output perturbation, and query restriction. We focus on the query restriction approach, which prevents malicious inferences by denying some unsafe queries. In particular, we deal with the on-line auditing problem [6] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [12] . With on-line auditing, queries are answered one by one, in sequence, and the auditor has to determine whether the SDB is compromised when answering a new query.
In references [2] , [3] and [4] , we have proposed, for the on-line max and min auditing, a Bayesian network (BN) as a disclosure Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. control tool, based on probabilistic inferences that can be drawn from released data. The model is able to:
• deal with on-line max and min auditing without maintaining query logs;
• deal with a probabilistic definition of privacy, independently of the probability distribution of the sensitive field;
• manage efficiently duplicated values of the sensitive field;
• provide a graphical representation of user knowledge;
• capture user prior knowledge;
• consider the case in which a denial leaks information.
In references [2] , [3] and [4] , the database is static.
The original contribution of this paper is to extend the approach proposed in [2] , [3] and [4] to dynamic databases for on-line max auditing. A static database is one that never changes after it has been created. Most census are static: whenever a new version of the database is created, the new version is considered to be another static database. A dynamic databases can change over time. This feature can complicate the privacy problem considerably, because frequent releases of new versions may enable users to make use of the differences among the versions in ways that are difficult to foresee. References [15] and [11] deal with security of dynamic statistical databases when records can be inserted or deleted from the databases; reference [11] , in particular, considers the context of a partitioned database.
In this paper, we deal with on-line max auditing in dynamic SDBs. More specifically, we consider the case in which some sensitive values change their value and some records are deleted or inserted.
In the following, we provide examples that show the importance to consider, in the on-line max auditing, a dynamic database rather than a sequence of static databases. In order to deal with the insertion of new records in dynamic SDBs, we will build a BN as shown in Section 3. Thus, in our approach, we consider dynamic databases and we assume at first that the user does not know if a sensitive value changes or not (Section 3.2.1), then we assume that the user has prior knowledge about a value increase or decrease (Section 3.2.2).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces notions and definitions useful in the sequel of the work; in particular, in Section 2.1 we summarize the Bayesian approach for on-line max auditing introduced in our previous works [2] , [3] and [4] for static SDBs. Section 3 extends the previous model to dynamic databases. Section 4 discusses the results of a preliminary set of experiments and Section 5 provides conclusion and future work.
PRELIMINARIES
We assume that:
• T is a table with n records;
• X and Y are two fields of T such that the elements of X represented by xi, with i ∈ K, are distinct among them (each x i identifies uniquely a subject) and the elements of Y , represented by y i , are real numbers;
• the sensitive field Y has r distinct values (r ≤ n);
• the private information takes the form of an association, (x i , y i ) ⊆ X × Y , that is a pair of values in the same tuple;
• the answer corresponding to a max query q is equal to max
• m is the answer to a max query; • l = |q| > 1, because if q = {j}, clearly, yj is breached irrespective of the value of m and the association (xj, m) is disclosed.
In Section 2.1, we will describe the approach used in references [2] , [3] and [4] , focusing only on max on-line auditing.
We consider the following definition of probabilistic compromise: DEFINITION 1. A privacy breach occurs if and only if a private association is disclosed with probability greater or equal to a given tolerance probability tol. If a private association is disclosed with tol = 1, then the SDB is fully compromised.
Finally, we recall the definition of upper bound provided in references [9] and [12] ; the authors define, for each element yj, with j ∈ K, the upper bound µ j as follows: DEFINITION 2. ∀yj, µj = min{m k |j ∈ q k with q k a max query and m k the answer} is the minimum over the answers to the max queries containing j.
In other words, µ j is the best possible upper bound for y j that can be obtained from the answers to the max queries.
A Bayesian approach to on-line max auditing
A BN is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of variables and their probabilistic dependencies [14] . A BN, also called belief net, is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) which consists of nodes, to represent variables, and arcs, to represent dependencies between variables. Arcs, or links, also represent causal influences among the variables. The strength of an influence between variables is represented by the conditional probabilities which are summarized in a conditional probability table (CPT). If there is an arc from node A to another node B, A is called a parent of B, and B is a child of A. The set of parent nodes of a node Xi is denoted parents(Xi).
The size of the CPT of a node X i depends on the number s of its states, the number n of parents(X i ), and the number s j of parent states, in the following way:
For every possible combination of parent states, there is an entry listed in the CPT. Notice that for a large number of parents the CPT will expand drastically. If X i has no parents, its local probability distribution is said to be unconditional, otherwise it is conditional. If the value of a node is observed, then the node is said to be an evidence node.
In our approach, we use a BN to encode user knowledge about the private associations after a sequence of max queries. The BN contains nodes encoding the sensitive values and nodes encoding the max queries; by adding evidence on nodes encoding the max queries, the BN is able to compute the probability of disclosing the sensitive values.
Independence of causal influence (ICI) [16] among local parentchild or cause-effect relationship allows for further factoring. ICI has been used to reduce the complexity of knowledge acquisition. The size of conditional distribution that encodes the max (or min) operator can be reduced when the n-ary max (resp. min) operator is decomposed into a set of binary max (resp. min) operators. Two well known approaches to the decomposition are: parent divorcing [13] and temporal transformation [7] . We use temporal transformation, which constructs a linear decomposition tree where each node encodes a binary operator (see Example 4). EXAMPLE 4. Given Table 1 and let q = {1, 2, 3} be a max query, then the 3-query is decomposed into a set of binary max queries by means of a temporal transformation as shown in Figure  1 . At first we build the binary max node encoding the max between y 1 and y 2 , then we build the binary max node encoding q.
We can see that if we insert evidence on node encoding q, we obtain for i = 1, 2, 3, the probabilities P (y i = 9|m = 9).
REMARK 1. In this paper, we assume that the user has not prior knowledge about the probability distribution of the sensitive field; for instance if the user knows that a sensitive value y i is such that yi ≤ m then we assume that
. In our previous work [4] , we have also considered the case in which the probability distribution of the sensitive field is known. REMARK 2. In references [2] , [3] and [4] , we assume that the sensitive field is ordered in a decreasing way; in Section 3, in order to consider the insertion of new records, we will remove this assumption.
REMARK 3. The size of the CPT for a BN encoding a temporal transformation grows linearly with the size of the query [4] .
We build the BN for the on-line max auditing problem at runtime, that is we execute a temporal transformation after each max user query and decide whether or not to answer the query. EXAMPLE 5. We continue Example 4. We suppose that the user submits the max query q 2 = {1, 4} with m 2 = 9. The BN in Figure  1 changes in the BN in Figure 2 . Since the private association (x1, 9) is disclosed with probability equal to 0.7273, by Definition 1, the privacy is preserved if and only if we choose a tolerance value greater than 0.7273.
The answer to a query is denied if (see [4] ):
1. the privacy is breached (see Definition 1); 2. the probability that a sensitive variable is equal to a value is greater or equal to a given tolerance threshold (even if this value is not the actual value of the sensitive data item);
3. for a possible answer to qt, the probability that a sensitive variable is equal to a value is greater or equal to a given tolerance threshold (even if this value is not the actual value of the sensitive data item).
Item 2 and 3 allow us to deal with the case in which denial leaks information.
In the following, we recall some details of the BN (see [5] ) that are useful to understand the sequel. In order to reduce total CPT size of the BN, it is optimized in the following way:
• an evidence node has not children.
.., i l+k } be two max queries of size l and l + k respectively, with q 1 ⊂ q 2 and m = m 1 = m 2 . Thus, the temporal transformation for q2 is such that the first l −1 max nodes overlap with the nodes of the temporal transformation for q 1 , and the other nodes have the same states of the the first l − 1 max nodes. Thus, after q 1 and q 2 , each max node has two states: r 1 encoding the case in which the node value is less than m, and r2 encoding the case in which the node value is equal to m. Because the last node in the temporal transformation of q 1 , that is the node encoding the binary max operator between max{y 1 , ..., y l−1 } and y l , is 
an evidence node and its value is equal to m with probability 1, then the other nodes of temporal transformation of q2 have the same states and, obviously, their value is equal to m with probability equal to 1, without inserting evidence. Thus, it is not needed to store these nodes: it is sufficient, for each sensitive variable y j ∈ {y l+1 , y l+2 , ..., y l+k }, by Remark 1, to set P r(yj < m|yj ≤ m) = Table 1 and q 1 = {1, 2}, the corresponding BN is shown in Figure 3 a) . After the answer to q2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the BN is updated as shown in Figure 3 b) . Because related to q1 there is an evidence node, this node has not children and the nodes encoding y 3 and y 4 have probability distribution equal to ( ).
• each child of y j has the same states of y j . If the sensitive variable is in more than one query then only the queries with max value equal to µj are useful to compute the probability that y j is equal to µ j .
Given j ∈ K = {1, ..., n}, let q 1 and q 2 be two max queries such that j ∈ q 1 ∩ q 2 and µ j = m 1 < m 2 . Then, the states of yj are: r1 encoding the case in which yj is less than m1; r2 encoding the case in which yj is equal to m1. Moreover, the max node in the temporal transformation of q 2 with parent y j is deleted. Finally, if j is the last element of q 2 , that is q 2 = {i 1 , ..., i l } with i l = j, then it is needed to insert evidence on node encoding max{i1, ...
The reasoning is analogous if m1 > m2 = µj.
If there is a set of m queries, such that j ∈ k=m k=1 q k , it is possible the reasoning in an analogous way. EXAMPLE 7. Given Table 1 In conclusion, each node has only children with the same states and an evidence node has not children. 
A BAYESIAN APPROACH FOR DYNAMIC DATABASES
In this section we assume that the database is updated, and insertions, deletions, and changes in the sensitive values are possible. In particular, we assume that the user knows if:
1. a new record is inserted;
2. a record is deleted.
If a sensitive values changes, then at first we suppose that the user does not know if a sensitive value is modified or not (Section 3.2.1), then we suppose that the user knows if a sensitive value increases or decreases (Section 3.2.2).
Inserting records
The insertion of new records in our model is very straightforward.
Since we have to insert new records in the DB, in contrast with the previous models in [2] , [3] , [4] , we do not order the DB by sensitive field in decreasing way, but when an user submits a max query q with answer equal to m, we select an element i ∈ q such that y i = m and the first node in the temporal transformation will be the Figure 1 but the first node in the temporal transformation is the node encoding y3 and not the node encoding y1. Thus, at first we build the binary max node encoding the max between y3 and y2, then we build the binary max node encoding q.
In this way, it is possible to add new records in the database and to store the user knowledge about the other records. EXAMPLE 9. Given Table 1 , we suppose that the user knows the max value between y1 and y2 and the corresponding BN, encoding user knowledge, is shown in Figure 3 a 
Deleting and modifying records
We deal with the deletion of records under the two following conditions:
Condition 1 If a record is deleted then it will be never inserted into the database again;
Condition 2 If a record is deleted then the value of its sensitive field can be disclosed.
We suppose that the record corresponding to x i (each x i identifies uniquely a subject) is deleted from the DB or the sensitive value y i changes, in particular it increases or decreases.
Then, if Q = {q 1 , ..., q t } is the set of queries already submitted, two cases are possible:
• there is not a query q j ∈ Q such that i ∈ q j ; Figure 5 : BN encoding user knowledge after max queries q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and q 2 = {2, 3, 5, 6}.
• there is one or more queries containing i.
Only in the second case, we have to update the BN.
Therefore, we consider the following cases:
1. the record corresponding to x i is deleted;
2. y i increases;
3. y i decreases.
In the sequel, µ i denotes the upper bound of y i (see Definition 2).
The user does not know if a sensitive value has changed
In this section, we assume that if a record is deleted or a sensitive value changes, then the BN encoding user knowledge is updated in such way that only the user information that remains valid for the new version of the database is stored. For instance, if a sensitive value changes its value and the previous user information, about this value and the max queries including it, is false, then this information is deleted. As a matter of fact, this false information does not help the auditor to preserve the privacy and to store it requires memory.
Under the hypotheses that the user does not know if a sensitive value y i increases or decreases, then:
1. let qj be a max a query such that i ∈ qj. If the record corresponding to x i is deleted then the user knows that m q j \{i} ≤ m j ;
2. let qj be a max a query such that i ∈ qj. If the value of y i increases more than its upper bound then a part of the BN provides false information and it must be deleted; else, if the value of y i increases less or equal to its upper bound, then the BN is not updated;
3. let qj be a max a query such that i ∈ qj. If the value of y i decreases then: if the node encoding y i is the first node in a temporal transformation then a part of the BN provides false information (the leaf node in the corresponding temporal transformation is not an evidence node) and a part of the BN can be deleted; else, if there is not a temporal transformation such that the node encoding y i is the first node, then the BN is not updated. EXAMPLE 10. Given Table 3 , if the user gets the answers to the max queries q 1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and q 2 = {2, 3, 5, 6}, with m 1 = m2 = 8, then the BN encoding user knowledge is shown in Figure  5 .
If the record corresponding to x 3 (resp. to x 2 ) is deleted from the DB, then the user does not know if m 1 and m 2 are equal or not to 8, but he knows that each yi with i = 3 (resp. i = 2) is less or equal to 8. The corresponding BN is shown in Figure 6 a) (resp. Figure 6 b) ).
If the record corresponding to x 1 (resp. to x 4 ) is deleted from the DB, then the user does not know if m1 is equal or not to 8, but he knows that each yi with i = 1 (resp. i = 4) is less or equal to 8 and he knows the information derived from evidence on m 2 =8. The corresponding BN is shown in Figure 6 c) (resp. Figure 6 d) ).
If the record corresponding to x5 (resp. to x6) is deleted from the DB, then the user does not know if m 2 is equal or not to 8, but he knows that each y i with i = 5 (resp. i = 6) is less or equal to 8 and he knows the information derived from evidence on m 1 =8. The corresponding BN is shown in Figure 6 e) (resp. Figure 6 f) ). If y 1 (resp. y 4 ) increases more than 8, then m 1 is not equal to 8; thus, we store only user knowledge about y i with i = 1 (resp. i = 4), that is y i ≤ 8, and the information derived from evidence on m2=8. See Figure 6 c) (resp. Figure 6 
d)).
If y 5 (resp. y 6 ) increases more than 8, then m 2 is not equal to 8; thus, we store only user knowledge about y i with i = 5 (resp. i = 6), that is yi ≤ 8, and the information derived from evidence on m1=8. See Figure 6 e) (resp. Figure 6 f) ). Figure 5 .
Algorithm 1 describes how to update the BN. In the algorithm, we use the following notation:
• M axN ode is a node encoding a max query or a max subquery.
• T ypeM odif y indicates the kind of update. It is equal to 'M' if the sensitive value y i changes; it is equal to 'D' if the record corresponding to x i is deleted from the database;
• if T ypeM odif y is equal to 'M' then newV alue is the new value of y i ;
• if M axN ode has not children then children.size = 0;
• if M axN ode is not an evidence node then evidenceIsEntered = f alse;
• µ i is the upper bound of y i before of its modification. 
The user knows if a sensitive value increases or decreases
Under the hypotheses that the user knows if a sensitive value y i increases or decreases, then:
1. let qj be a max a query such that i ∈ qj. If the user knows that the record corresponding to x i is deleted, then he knows that m q j \{i} ≤ m j (as in Section 3.2.1);
2. let q j be a max a query such that i ∈ q j and m j = µ i . If the user knows that the value of y i increases, then he does not if
3. let qj be a max a query such that i ∈ qj and mj = µ i . If the user knows that the value of y i decreases, then he knows that y i < m j .
EXAMPLE 12.
If the user gets the answers to the max queries q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and q2 = {2, 3, 5, 6}, with m1 = m2 = 8, then the BN encoding user knowledge is shown in Figure 5 .
If the user knows that y 3 increases (resp. y 2 ), then he has not information about y3 (resp. y2), because one the following cases are possible: y3 < 8 (resp. y2 < 8); y3 = 8 (resp. y2 = 8); y3 > 8 (resp. y 2 > 8). As a consequence, he has not information about m 1 and m 2 , he knows only that y i ≤ 8, ∀i = 3(resp. i = 2). See Figure 6 a) (resp. Figure 6 b) ).
If the user knows that y1 increases (resp. y4), then he has not information about y 1 (resp. y 4 ). As a consequence, he has not information about m 1 , he knows only that y i ≤ 8, ∀i = 1(resp. i = 4) and the information derived from evidence on m2 = 8 . See Figure  6 c) (resp. Figure 6 d) ).
If the user knows that y 5 increases (resp. y 6 ), then he has not information about y 5 (resp. y 6 ). As a consequence, he has not information about m2, he knows only that yi ≤ 8, ∀i = 5(resp. i = 6) and the information derived from evidence on m1 = 8 . See Figure  6 e) (resp. Figure 6 f) ).
If the user knows that y 3 decreases (resp. y 2 ), then he knows that y3 < 8 (resp. y2 < 8) and that m1 ≤ 8 and m2 ≤ 8. Thus, we add evidence on the node encoding y3 (resp. y2), and remove evidence on the max nodes encoding q 1 and q 2 . In alternative to removing evidence on the max nodes, we obtain the same probabilities for nodes y i ∀i = 3(resp. i = 2) if we delete all max nodes and we store only node encoding yi ≤ 8, ∀i = 3(resp. i = 2). See Figure 8 a) (resp. Figure 8 b) ).
If the user knows that y 1 decreases (resp. y 4 ), then he knows that y1 < 8 (resp. y4 < 8) , that yi ≤ 8, ∀i = 1(resp. i = 4) and information derived from evidence on m2 = 8. See Figure 8 c) (resp. Figure 8 d) ).
If the user knows that y 5 decreases (resp. y 6 ), then he knows that y5 < 8 (resp. y6 < 8) , that yi ≤ 8, ∀i = 5(resp. i = 6) and information derived from evidence on m1 = 8. See Figure 8 e) (resp. Figure 8 
f)).
Algorithm 2 describes how to update the BN. We use the same notation used in Algorithm 1, moreover oldV alue denotes the old value of y i before the update of the DB.
EXPERIMENTATION
The experimentation is conducted on a computer with the following properties: HP Compaq dc7100; Pentium(R) 4 CPU 2.80 GHz; 2 GB of RAM. In the experimentation, set tolerance (see Definition 1) equal to tol = 0.8 and we run sequences of 100 queries. We consider a baseball dataset in [17] ; it consists of 377 records. We have added a field ID, in such way that (ID, Salary) is the private association, with ID the field identifying the baseball player
Figure 8: We update the BN in Figure 5 by means of Algorithm 2, when: a) y3 decreases, b) y2 decreases, c) y1 decreases, d) y4 decreases, e) y5 decreases, f) y6 decreases. Thus, the results, in Figure 9 a) and 9 b), suggest that the hypothesis of the additional user knowledge, about the modifications of the sensitive values, allows us to optimize the CPT size after the DB updates; however, after 100 queries, the difference between the two CPT size is very small.
Finally, in order to analyze the utility of our auditor model, we consider the probability to deny; intuitively, it seems that the more an auditing scheme denies, the less useful it is. From a comparison between the probability to deny, we can see from Figure 9 c) and Figure 9 d) that it rises around to 0.5 with Algorithm 1 and around to 0.4 with Algorithm 2, after some 100 queries.
We can see that, after the updates, the probability to deny in Figure  9 c) increases more speedily than the probability to deny in Figure  9 d ).
This preliminary results suggest that it is reasonable to consider additional user prior knowledge, that is to consider the case in which the user knows if a sensitive value increases or decreases, thus dealing with the on-line max auditing in dynamic databases by means of Algorithm 2. However, further experimentation is needed.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a method to reasoning under uncertainty in on-line auditing of dynamic statistical databases; in particular, we consider the case in which records are added or deleted, or some sensitive values change their value.
The method extends the Bayesian approach presented in [2] , [3] and [4] for static databases and, as in the previous works, the model is able to:
• deal with on-line max auditing without maintaining query logs;
• deal with a probabilistic definition of privacy;
• consider the case in which denial leaks information.
The paper introduces two algorithms to update the network whenever the database changes and discusses results of a preliminary set of experimental trials.
The goal of our future work is twofold:
